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Anti-réalisme, rationalité limitée et théorie expérimentale de la décision

l'Institut d'Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques (Paris I-CNRS-ENS Ulm), au GREGHEC (CRNS-HEC), mikael.cozic{at}ens.fr, Département d'Etudes Cognitives (ENS Ulm)

This paper discusses anti-realist (or instrumentalist) objections against the bounded rationality research program in decision sciences. After a reconstruction of several versions of these objections, we expose an argument against the so-called behavioral version of the anti-realist objection according to which decision models should be assessed exclusively on the basis of behavioral data. Our argument relies on recent advances in experimental decision theory, especially on works that collect and exploit cognitive data.

Key Words: Anti-réalisme • Cognition • Instrumentalisme • Rationalité limitée • Théorie de la décision expérimentale

Social Science Information, Vol. 48, No. 1, 35-56 (2009)
DOI: 10.1177/0539018408099636


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