Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
Social Science Information
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Similar articles in ISI Web of Science
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via ISI Web of Science (8)
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Right arrow Citing Articles via Scopus
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Cronk, L.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
 Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati  
What's this?

The application of animal signaling theory to human phenomena: some thoughts and clarifications

Lee Cronk

Department of Anthropology at Rutgers University, lcronk{at}anthropology.rutgers.edu

Animal signaling theory has recently become popular among anthropologists as a way to study human communication. One aspect of animal signaling theory, often known as costly signaling or handicap theory, has been used particularly often. This article makes four points regarding these developments: (1) signaling theory is broader than existing studies may make it seem; (2) costly signaling theory has roots in the social as well as the biological sciences; (3) not all honest signals are costly and not all costs borne by signalers serve to ensure honesty; and (4) hard-to-fake signals are favored when the interests of broad categories of signalers and receivers conflict but the interests of individual signalers and receivers converge.

Key Words: Costly signaling theory • Costly signals • Hard-to-fake signals • Honest signals • Receiver psychology • Signaling theory • Signals

Social Science Information, Vol. 44, No. 4, 603-620 (2005)
DOI: 10.1177/0539018405058203


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati    What's this?